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Introduction
It is commonly believed that Title IX has had one of the greatest impacts on 
women and girl’s involvement in sport in the United States and beyond. In 2021, 
50 years on from its inception, the development of women’s sport and women’s 
opportunity within the sporting sphere has increased dramatically. It is doubtless 
that Title IX has increased participation opportunities and “the question is no 
longer, ‘can women play?’ The critical question is ‘at what level?’ That’s the 
21st century question.”1 
However, while the positive impacts of Title IX are undisputed, women 
continue to face significant challenges and inequality. Thus, women continue to 
challenge persistent barriers regarding opportunity, treatment, and access. More 
recently, this has manifested into pay and working disputes at the international 
level. The current U.S. Women’s National (Soccer) Team’s (USWNT) equal pay 
lawsuit has sparked interest and debate from sporting federations, athletes, and 
the media alike. More specifically, it can be argued that the lawsuit has acted as 
a catalyst for global equal pay disputes across a number of different countries 
and sporting federations. For example, Denmark, Norway, and New Zealand 
have all embarked upon discussions and negotiations as to equal pay in 
relation to their men’s and women’s soccer teams. Thus, Part I of this article 
will illustrate that although Title IX has increased participation and 
opportunity for female athletes within the educational sphere in the U.S., it has 
also created, in the form 
1  Staurowsky, E. (2003a). Title IX and college sport: The long and painful path to compliance and 
reform. Marquette Sports Law Review, 14(1), 95-121, at 96.
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of the USWNT in particular, a generation of athletes who have an appetite for 
equality beyond education and participation, in respect of equal pay, treatment, 
and working conditions, which has transcended into Europe and beyond. 
Although the USWNT’s lawsuit has sparked equal pay disputes across the 
globe, their downfall was that they ultimately could not prove a breach of the 
Equal Pay Act. Thus, in order to accelerate and win the battle for equal pay, 
Part II of this article will illustrate that a push for legislative reform is instead 
required. The USWNT will continue to struggle to claim a breach of the EPA 
under their current collective bargaining agreement, which supports the argu-
ment that legislative reform can aid in closing the gender pay gap, as seen in the 
Icelandic model.
Part I.
Title IX: A Brief Overview
In 1972, under President Richard Nixon, the U.S. Congress enacted the Education 
Amendments Act, an amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Title IX states: 
“No person in the U.S. shall, on the basis of sex be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational 
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”2
This specifically applies to “institutions of vocational education, profes-
sional education, and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of 
undergraduate higher education.”3 Put simply, Title IX seeks to combat gender 
discrimination in education and prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in 
state-funded educational institutions. 
Sport was one of the only aspects of education where strict sex integration, 
as expected by Title IX, would not work. In Dunkel’s study on gender equality 
in sport, the pervasiveness of gender inequality in the U.S. collegiate system 
prior to Title IX was stark: Often women’s sport programs had no institutional 
funding, compared to seven-figure financial reserves for the men’s programs.4 
Coaches of women’s teams were often unpaid volunteers, compared to salaried 
coaches of men’s teams. In many instances, solving these were simple: women’s 
teams were to receive institutional funding, and their coaches were to be paid. 
The biggest challenge was determining what was ‘equitable,’ given that having 
equal and identical programs of sports was not necessarily going to be desirable.
2  Civil Rights Act, 20 U.S.C.D. $1681(a) (1972).
3  Civil Rights Act, 20 U.S.C.D. $1681(a)(1) (1972).
4  Sandler, B. R. (2007). Title IX: How we got it and what a difference it made: Celebrating thir-
ty-five years of sport and Title IX. Cleveland State Law Review, 55(4), 473-490.
Under the Education Amendments of 1974, section 844 gave the United 
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare a mandate to develop regu-
lations that would aid the implementation and adherence to Title XI regulations. 
It stated it should create:
proposed regulations implementing the provisions of Title IX of the Ed-
ucation Amendments of 1972 relating to the prohibition of sex discrim-
ination in federally assisted education programs which shall include 
with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities reasonable provisions 
considering the nature of particular sports.5 
By 1978, the Department had received close to 100 complaints relating to 50 
educational institutions. Thus, in response, the Department issued a policy 
interpretation:
to provide a framework within which the complaints can be resolved, 
and to provide institutions of higher education with additional guidance 
on the requirements of compliance with Title IX in intercollegiate ath-
letic programs.6 
The Policy split the requirements into three different sections: accommo-
dation of interests and abilities, athletic financial assistance, and other program 
areas.7 Under the ‘accommodation and interests’ section, a three-part test was be-
ing developed. This test provides institutions with three different ways to comply 
with their obligations, while schools can choose which one it meets, and these can 
differ from year to year.8 Test one requires proportionality, in that participation 
opportunities for all genders are proportionate to full-time undergraduate en-
rolment.9 Test two requires continued expansion of athletic opportunities for the 
underrepresented sex, while test three requires full and effective accommodation 
of the underrepresented sex, taking into account their interests and abilities.10 
In relation to ‘athletic financial assistance,’ compliance under this heading 
states that financial assistance (i.e., scholarships) must be proportionate to the 
participation of male and female athletes.11 When complying with ‘other program 








areas’ a number of key aspects are to be assessed. Thus, Title IX also requires 
the equal treatment of men and women in the provisions of (a) equipment 
and supplies, (b) scheduling of games and practice times, (c) travel and daily 
allowance/per diem, (d) access to tutoring, (e) coaching, (f) locker rooms, (g) 
medical and training facilities and services, (h) housing and dining facilities and 
services, (i) publicity and promotions, (j) support services, and (k) recruitment 
and student-athletes.12 Thus, students who go on to turn professional, who have 
previously enjoyed equal treatment under Title IX, now seek that equality beyond 
the educational sphere—and the USWNT’s lawsuit epitomizes this point. 
Early Legal Challenges and the Continued Fight for Compliance
Since its inception, Title IX “has provoked intense public interest and scrutiny 
when applied to federally funded, school sponsored athletic programmes.”13 
Birch Bayh, the principal sponsor in the Senate, stated the purpose of Title IX 
was to be a “strong and comprehensive measure [that would] provide women 
with legal protection from the persistent, pernicious discrimination’ that had 
relegated women to second class status as citizens.”14 While there is no doubt that 
the legislation has improved the status and opportunities of women, resistance to 
such change has been evident since the inception of Title IX. Thus, this section 
will briefly outline some of the key challenges and lawsuits concerning violations 
of Title IX throughout the years.
Challenge and resistance to Title IX was spearheaded by the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the governing body responsible for 
the overseeing of college athletes. The then all-male association was concerned 
about the implementation of Title IX, over a fear that it would lead to the purport-
ed demise of male sport.15 By means of example, in 1974, Senator John Tower 
carried forward the NCCA’s objections through the ‘Tower Amendment,’ which 
sought to remove athletics from the scope of Title IX completely. 
In 1981, the first Title IX case in the context of sport was heard. In Haffer v. 
Temple University,16 eight female undergraduate athletes filed a class action suit 
on the basis that Temple University had subjected them to discriminatory athletic 
policies. The University denied that any policy was discriminatory, and in any 
12  Id.
13  Staurowsky, E. (2003b). Title IX in its third decade: The Commission on Opportunity in Ath-
letics. Entertainment Law, 2(3), 70-93.
14  Id., at 72.
15  Staurowsky, supra note 15.
16  Haffer v. Temple University [1981] 1524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
case, Title IX only applied to academic programs that received federal funding 
and not athletics. It was held Title IX covered any activity that benefitted from 
federal funds, including athletics.17 
However, the decision of Haffer and its effect was short lived. In 1984, the 
case of Grove City College v. Bell18 represented a setback and could potentially 
have affected Title IX’s ability to transcend into the world of athletics long-term. 
The decision was illustrative of the NCAA’s continued resistance to the imple-
mentation of Title IX. While policy and interpretations were being developed, 
the NCAA had been actively seeking a college that would instigate litigation 
questioning the applicability of Title IX to college sports. Such was its resistance, 
the NCAA provided legal counsel support for the college.19 Grove City College, 
a small, church-affiliated private institution, had refused to directly accept any 
forms of government assistance on the basis that the compliance with the gov-
ernment rules required for such a system would compromise its independence.20 
However, in 1976, the Department of Education (formally the Executive Branch 
Department) required an assurance of compliance to be filed in respect of Title 
IX regulations. This was due to the fact that a small number of students received 
direct grants through the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant (BFOG), which 
was operated by the federal government.21 Grove refused to file the assurance of 
compliance, arguing that it did not receive federal financial assistance, resulting 
in the loss of these grants. Thus, the college brought proceedings in the District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania requesting that the court overturn 
the termination of the grants and order the Department of Education to withdraw 
the request for compliance. It was held the Department could remove the finan-
cial assistance based upon the college’s refusal to file a notice of compliance, 
even in the absence of a finding of discrimination.22 In the Supreme Court, a 
6-3 majority held that in instances where students themselves directly receive 
federally funded grants, Title IX requirements only apply to the specific program 
for which the grant was used.23 Thus, the requirement of gender equality did 
not transcend across an educational institution as a whole, but somewhat more 
narrowly, only to the program for which the grant was being used. Since little or 
no federal grants went directly into athletic programs, the Grove ruling had the 
17  Id., at 535.
18  Grove City College v. Bell [1984] 465 U.S. 555.
19  Staurowsky, supra note 1.
20  Grove City College v. Bell, at 559
21  Id.
22  Id., at 602-604.
23  Id.
potential to make it particularly difficult to regulate and implement Title IX into 
high school and college sport. The effect of this ruling was that the Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR), the body responsible for Title IX regulation, “immediately 
dropped or narrowed almost forty pending Title IX athletics investigations” and 
“suspended cases where discrimination had been found [to exist].”24
In response to the Grove ruling, Congress passed the Civil Rights Resto-
ration Act in 1988,25 due to concern that the Supreme Court decision had limited 
the application and scope of Title IX. Dubbed the ‘Grove City Bill,’ the Act 
fundamentally overturned the ruling in Grove and made it clear that where any 
part of an educational institution receives federal funding, every part of that in-
stitution is subject to the Title IX regulations—no longer relying on the Supreme 
Courts’ interpretation of a ‘specific program.’26 This bolstering or solidifying 
of the rights guaranteed under Title IX continued through a number of cases 
post-Grove. 
This application of Title IX was enhanced by the creation of a private right of 
action. In 1979, the case of Cannon v. University of Chicago27 created this private 
right of action despite the legislation’s failure or omission to expressly authorize 
one. It was held that it was the intent of the legislation to provide individuals who 
had been subject to violations this private right,28 further enhancing the scope of 
Title IX. 
In 1990, Cohen v. Brown29 illustrated a further fight against Title IX viola-
tions. Having dominated gymnastics and winning the Ivy League Championship, 
Brown University cut the women’s team’s funding the following year.30 As such, 
the club went from a varsity sport to being completely dependent on donations, 
in line with several other budget cuts to the men’s golf and water polo teams and 
the women’s volleyball team.31 Brown’s position was that as a result of having 
one of the best women’s athletic programs in the country, they were therefore not 
in breach of their Title IX requirements. One particular gymnast, Amy Cohen, 
brought together members of both the volleyball and gymnastic team and filed 
24  Staurowsky, supra note 1, at 104.
25  The Civil Rights Restoration Act, 20. U.S.C. $1687 (1988).
26  GovTrack.us. (2021). S. 557 — 100th Congress: Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. Retrieved 
from https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/100/s557 
27  Cannon v. University of Chicago 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
28  Id., at 677.
29  Cohen v. Brown, 101 F.3d. 155 (1991).
30  Athletics. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.protecttitleix.com/athletics
31  Id. 
a class action suit against the university.32 The Cohen litigation spanned across 
four court cases. In the first, the U.S. District Court granted a preliminary in-
junction that required Brown to fund the women’s team and prevented further 
cuts to women sports until the case could be heard.33 Following this, the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the lower court following the 
appeal by Brown.34 In 1994, the trial began in which Judge Pettine found in favor 
of the plaintiffs. The parties agreed to a partial settlement, which recognized 
many of Brown’s practices were non-discriminatory such as access to facilities 
and assignment of coaches, leading Brown to agree to continue this for a period 
of three years.35 However, in the last of the Cohen litigation, Brown appealed the 
District Court’s ruling. In this decision, the court held:
we find no error in the district court’s factual findings or in its inter-
pretation and application of the law in determining that Brown violated 
Title IX in the operation of its intercollegiate athletics program. We 
therefore affirm in all respects the district court’s analysis and rulings 
on the issue of liability.36 
It is notable that across all four cases, each court consistently protected the rights 
given to individuals under Title IX—illustrative of the continued pursuit of 
compliance post-Grove.
Further enhancing the protections under the legislation was the 1992 
Franklin v. Gwinnett Public Schools37 litigation. Although concerning the sexual 
harassment of a pupil and not sport-specific, the ruling meant that schools and 
institutions who failed to comply with Title IX regulations could be sued for 
both compensatory and punitive damages.38 The acceptance of both classes of 
damages is arguably telling in illustrating the courts’ approach to violations of 
Title IX, thus forcing institutions to take compliance seriously. As Staurowsky 
explains, this was “heralded as a wake-up call for athletics administrators and 
institutions that had previously faced virtually no meaningful penalties for not 
32  Id. 
33  Cohen v. Brown University, 809 F Supp. 978 (D.R.I) (1992) at 1001.
34  Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d, 888, (1st Circ. 1993) at 907.
35  For the settlement agreement, see Cohen v. Brown University - Settlement Agreement and Stip-
ulation of Dismissal in Regard to Equality of Treatment. (1994). Civil Rights Litigation Clearing-
house. Retrieved from https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/ED-RI-0001-0006.pdf
36  Cohen v. Brown University, 101 F.3d, 155 (1996).
37  Franklin v. Gwinnett Country Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
38  Id., at 75
complying with the law.”39 Prior to this ruling, authorities were only obliged to 
end the discrimination.
Title IX compliance breaches and, as such, lawsuits have continued throughout 
the 21st century, despite over 30 years that had passed since its inception. In 2001, 
in the Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Association40 
(MHSAA) female athletes from Michigan High School initiated proceedings after 
their school had refused to allow additional sports, provided inferior practice and 
playing facilities, and required girls to play sports out of season (e.g., volleyball 
was played in the winter).41 This avoided competition with the corresponding male 
teams for things such as equipment and funding. The effect of this meant reduced 
participation by having shorter seasons and preventing participation in competi-
tions involving other states, thereby lowering their chances of being chosen for 
college level sports. Interestingly, while outlining the job of the court, it stated it 
did not have to prove:
the MHSAA intended to hurt girls and chose the scheduling system as 
a way to do that … the Court’s task is to analyze the resulting athletic 
opportunities for girls and boys from the different treatment that they 
experience by being placed indifferent athletic seasons, and if girls 
receive unequal opportunities, Title IX has been violated.42
In 2003, the three-part test of Title IX compliance was the subject of controversy 
and resistance, led by those representing college football, and male non-revenue 
(minor) producing sports. Within a framework of Title IX compliance, they 
instigated an allegation that such mechanisms amounted to a quota system and 
could subsequently injure male sport.43 The strength in this argument stemmed 
from the platform given to it by President George W. Bush’s presidential 
campaign in 2000 when he stated that he did not support “a system of quota’s or 
strict proportionality that pits one group against another”44 and rather, preferred 
a “reasonable approach to Title IX.”45 In 2002, the National Wrestling Coaches 
Association, together with representatives from other minor male sports, sued 
the U.S. Educational Department arguing that the three-part test was “arbitrary,” 
39  Staurowsky, supra note 1, at 104
40  Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805 
(W.D. Mich. 2001).
41  Id.
42  Id., at 856-857.
43  Griffith, C. C. (2003). Comments on Title IX. Marquette Sports Law Review, 14(1), 57-63, at 
60.
44  Staurowsky, supra note 1, at 106.
45  Id.
“capricious,” and the result of a flawed process of law-making.46 In spite of the 
U.S. Department of Justice view that the case should be dismissed, the White 
House supported the creation of a Commission on Opportunity in Athletics by 
the Department of Education.47 The criticism of the Commission was inarguably 
warranted, given that there was an absence of any civil rights experts, the 
composition was created in favor of the major powers in intercollegiate sports 
(two-thirds were associated with Division 1 institutions), and those who were 
chosen demonstrated a lack of knowledge of Title IX compliance and basic 
principles.48 Unsurprisingly, the Department of Education issued a letter that 
affirmed the Title IX regulations and policy, while the U.S. District Court 
dismissed the case.49 
It is somewhat difficult to outline the impact, controversy, and challenges 
the enactment of Title IX instigated. However, the aforementioned overview of 
a handful of case law and, in the main, the courts’ continued application and 
requirement of compliance with Title IX is illustrative of the accomplishment 
of the statutory purpose. However, simply outlining the legal challenges is not 
sufficient to truly understand the impact of Title IX and the catalytic effect in 
which it has had on the pursuit for equality within the world of sport. Thus, the 
next section will examine the USWNT’s equal pay lawsuit, which is arguably a 
result of a generation of athletes who have experienced the positives of Title IX 
equality within the educational sphere, who now seek to extend that equality into 
the realm of professional sport. 
The USWNT and Their Fight for Equality
The U.S. Women’s National Team is the most successful international soccer 
team in history. Of the 23 players on the USWNT that won the Women’s World 
Cup in 2019, 21 played NCAA Division I soccer.50 These are women, or ‘Title IX 
babies,’51 who have grown up in an education system that has emphasized equality 
of access, opportunity, and resource. Thus, these athletes are part of a cohort 
of women for whom opportunities to play and excel in sport have been present 
46  National Wrestling Coaches Association v. Department. of Education., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 85 
(D.D.C. 2003) at 98.
47  Staurowsky, supra note 1.
48  Id., at 106.
49  Id.
50  NCAA.com, S. S. (2019, July 08). Here’s where every member on the USWNT roster played 
college soccer. Retrieved from https://www.ncaa.com/news/soccer-women/article/2018-10-27/her-
es-where-every-member-uswnt-roster-played-college-soccer 
51  Schultz, J. (2018). Womens sports: What everyone needs to know. Oxford University Press.
since birth.52 It must be acknowledged from the outset that the USWNT equal pay 
lawsuit is not based on the Title IX legislation, but upon Equal Pay legislation. 
However, it must also be acknowledged that had these athletes not experienced 
the gender equality in sport that Title IX affords, these same athletes may not have 
been so forthcoming in their pursuit of equality in professional sport.
The filing of the 2019 lawsuit was not the first time the USWNT has en-
gaged in legal proceedings to secure improved working conditions and equality 
as professional athletes. In 2014, a number of national team players including 
Alex Morgan, Abby Wambach, and Heather O’Reilly (as well as those from other 
countries) initiated proceedings against both the Canadian Soccer Association 
and FIFA concerning the use of artificial pitches for the World Cup (the Men’s 
World Cup is played on grass).53 The case was eventually dropped, with FIFA 
citing Canadian weather conditions as justification,54 yet the controversy sur-
rounding the use of artificial pitches “marred this high-profile event before a ball 
had been kicked.”55 
In 2016, the USWNT’s pursuit of equal pay and working conditions com-
menced through an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
complaint. This ‘Equal Play, Equal Pay’ campaign sought to bring these issues 
into the forefront of the media. Carli Lloyd published an article in The New York 
Times while other members of the team appeared on the Today Show and the 
Daily Show to discuss their fight for equal pay.56 However, the complaint was to 
a certain extent administrative. Under U.S. federal law, employees must exhaust 
their potential remedies through the EEOC before seeking remedy through the 
courts.57 During the investigation, in 2017, a year after the initial complaint and 
after a series of negotiations, the USWNT signed a five-year collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA) with the United States Soccer Federation (USSF) that guaran-
teed increased pay, base salaries for 20 squad members, and greater per diems on 
par with what their male counterparts received. However, after failed mediation 
52  Id.
53  Fletcher, J., & Yang, S. (2017, February 3). The USWNT lawsuit timeline. Stars and Stripes 
FC. Retrieved from http://www.starsandstripesfc.com/2017/2/3/14498152/complete-updat-
ed-uswnt-ussf-cba-negotiation-timeline
54  Kessel, A. (2015, May 30). Biggest Women’s World Cup to kick off in Canada amid surface 
tension. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/may/30/wom-
ens-world-cup-canada-artificial-pitches
55  Carrick, S. N. (2019). Athlete image rights and the potential tax consequences in the UK and 
Canada [Thesis]. Stirling University.
56  Fletcher, supra note 53.
57  McCann, M. (2019, March 8). How USWNT’s CBA, EEOC impact new equal pay lawsuit. 
Sports Illustrated. Retrieved from http://www.si.com/soccer/2019/03/08/uswnt-lawsuit-us-soccer-
equal-pay-cba-eeoc-gender-discrimination
and exhaustion of EEOC remedies, the investigation ended on Feb. 5, 2019, and 
the USWNT were issued with a ‘right to sue’ letter, which signified that there 
were sufficient grounds to bring the issue to federal court.58 The USWNT had 90 
days to file a complaint to the court and did so on March 8, 2019, aptly known 
as International Women’s Day. Following further failed mediation in August of 
2019, the USWNT was certified as a class in November of the same year.59
In February of 2020, both the USSF and the USWNT filed motions for a 
summary judgment. In civil cases such as the one at hand, either party may make 
a pre-trial motion for such a judgment. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, for a summary judgment, the party must show that there is “no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact” and that the party is “entitled to the judgment 
as a matter of law.”60 The court may offer either a full summary judgment or a 
partial one, where some factual issues are ruled upon while judgment on others 
is reserved for court. The USWNT’s motion presented the work of an economic 
expert, who stated they could be owed $66 million in damages.61 The USSF’s 
motion caused particular controversy, suggesting that the men’s game required 
a higher level of skill, speed, and strength than the women’s game.62 Following 
the backlash from such language, USSF president Carlos Corderio resigned. On 
May 1, 2020, the summary judgment in relation to the alleged violations was 
held in the District Court of California. The outcome and legal implications of 
this matter will be discussed in more detail; suffice to say, this case represents 
the most significant and high-profile legal challenge of gender discrimination in 
women’s sport to date. 
The USWNT Lawsuit
On March 8, 2019, the USWNT launched a class action suit against the USSF on 
the basis of two claims. This was heard on May 1, 2020, in California. The first 
claim asserted that the USSF had breached section 206 of the Equal Pay Act, 
58  Id.
59  Fletcher, supra note 53.
60  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (2018) Motion for Summary Judgment, Rule 56(a), https://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/cv_rules_eff._dec._1_2018_0.pdf 
61  United States District Court, For the Central District of California Western Division, Case 
Number 2:19-cv-01717. (2020, February 4). Economic expert damages report of Finnie B. Cook, 
Ph.D. Retrieved from https://reason.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/WNT-Damage-Calcula-
tions.pdf
62  United States District Court, For the Central District of California Western Division, Case 
Number 2:19-cv-01717, Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in opposition to 
plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment (2020, March 30). Retrieved from https://assets.
documentcloud.org/documents/6807270/USSF-Arguments.pdf
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender. The second claim was that 
the USSF had breached the Civil Rights Act (1964), specifically Title VII, which 
prohibits discrimination during employment on the basis of sex.63 
Before assessing the outcome of these claims, it is useful to broadly outline 
the women’s and men’s (USMNT) national teams’ CBAs. The ‘current’ CBA 
for the USMNT was agreed to on Nov. 20, 2011, and expired on Dec. 31, 2018 
(although the USMNT has continued to be compensated on the basis of this 
agreement).64 The agreement is founded upon the ‘pay-to-play’ principle. Thus, 
players are only compensated when they attend training camps or make the team 
roster, while the USSF is under no obligation to schedule matches or enter teams 
in particular tournaments.65 Players receive bonuses based upon performance. 
The highest bonuses are available in the World Cup, where qualification sees 
the player pool receive $2.5 million plus an additional $68,750 bonus for each 
rostered player.66 A semifinal appearance would earn the player pool over $5 
million, while making the final would see this increase to more than $9 million.67 
In comparison, the USWNT’s CBA, valid from the Jan. 1, 2017, until Dec. 
31, 2021, is not based upon this ‘pay-to-play’ model. Rather, 20 contracted 
athletes earn a base salary of $100,000 and an additional salary of between 
$62,000–67,000 for playing in the National Women’s Soccer League (NWSL).68 
The rejection of the men’s model is primarily due to the precarity of their oc-
cupation, which makes a guaranteed salary a necessity—women do not have 
the same earning power as men in club soccer. To put this into context, male 
soccer player Christian Pulisic earns a reported $200,000 per week playing in 
the English Premier League for Chelsea FC,69 while many of the USWNT players 
do not make that in a year and must supplement their soccer income with jobs 
elsewhere. That said, it must be noted that the current CBA was agreed to by 
both parties. The USWNT also receives performance-related bonuses. Like the 
USMNT, the highest of such is in relation to the World Cup. The USWNT receive 
a qualification bonus of $37,500 and the same sum for appearing on the roster. 
63  Civil Rights Act (1964), s701(e).
64  Alex Morgan et al v. United States Soccer Federation, Inc (2020) Case No. 2:19-cv-01717-
RGK-AGR, at 2.
65  Id.
66  Id., at 3
67  Id.
68  Id., at 13.
69  Mojeed, O. (2020, July 5). Christian Pulisic weekly salary, net worth. Futball News. Retrieved 
from https://futballnews.com/christian-pulisic-weekly-wages-net-worth/
A gold medal brings $110,000 per player, silver $50,000, and bronze $25,000.70 
These figures are significantly lower to what the men’s team receives, and this 
is further exemplified by the fact that FIFA paid the winners of the men’s World 
Cup $38 million in 2018 and the women’s winners $4 million in 2019. The pro-
visions for health insurance, maternity pay, and a good faith clause to schedule 
a minimum number of games71 only serve to reinforce the argument that women 
athletes require these guarantees because the women’s game is not as well sup-
ported as the men, who have ample opportunities to play and earn significantly 
higher salaries, which lessen the need for such benefits. On the other hand, such 
benefits are benefits that their male counterparts do not receive, which should 
also be acknowledged.
The Equal Pay Act Claim
The Equal Pay Act (EPA) represents the biggest hurdle for the USWNT—a 
hurdle they have yet to overcome. For a successful claim under the EPA, the 
plaintiff must establish that they performed equal work, under similar working 
conditions, and that the USMNT was paid more.72 The latter was addressed first. 
The USWNT ascertained that it was paid less on the basis that the USWNT 
CBA provides lower bonuses for friendlies, World Cup appearances, and other 
tournaments, and enhanced this argument by illustrating what the players would 
have received should they have been compensated under the same CBA as the 
USMNT, even when fringe benefits such as health insurance were included.73 
The USSF argument focused on total compensation paid to players under their 
respective CBAs. By assessing total compensation paid during the contested 
period between 2015 and 2019, the USWNT earned $220,747 per game while the 
USMNT earned $212,639 per game.74 This argument is strengthened by the fact 
that U.S. employment law defines wages as:
all forms of compensation … and whether called wages, salary, profit 
sharing, expense account, monthly minimum, uniform cleaning allow-
ance, hotel accommodations, use of company car, gasoline allowance, 
or some other name.75 
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Wages also include fringe benefits such as “medical, hospital, life insurance and 
retirement benefits.”76 However, at the class certification stage, the court had 
ruled:
it could not conclude that no discrimination had occurred solely on the 
fact that the WNT players received more compensation because to do 
so would lead to an absurd result where an employer who pays a women 
$10 per hour and a man $20 per hour would not violate the EPA … as 
long as the women negated the disparity by working twice as many 
hours.77 
This point is pivotal: The USWNT earned more because they worked more 
and won more. However, since the class ruling, the court held the plaintiffs had 
sufficient time to prove the aforementioned point. At the summary judgment, 
the evidence presented did not do so. During class period, the USWNT played 
111 games and made $24.5 million, $220,747 per game. The USMNT played 87 
games and made $18.5 million, $212,639 per game.78 Thus, the downfall of the 
EPA claim was based upon the reality that during the class period in question, 
the USWNT earned more than the USMNT and a successful claim requires the 
plaintiff to prove they earned less than their male counterparts. This downfall is 
rooted in the differing CBAs and the success of the USWNT. It is a legitimate 
argument that if the USWNT was not as successful, thereby lowering its win 
bonus total, a successful EPA claim may well have been possible. However, the 
‘takeaway’ here is that in law, there was no breach of the EPA, the consequences 
and solutions to which will be discussed in Part II of this artcile.
The Title VII Claim
The second part of the USWNT claim provided more success. Title VII prohibits 
discrimination in employment on the basis of sex (among others).79 The USWNT 
claim was based upon unequal working conditions in relation to field surfaces and 
travel conditions.80 Under Title VII, the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff. 
If this burden is proven, then it transfers to the defendant to provide a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for the difference in working conditions.81
76  Id.
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In the case of field surfaces, the USWNT contended that the players were 
made to compete on inferior surfaces (artificial turf) more often than their male 
counterparts who had temporary grass installed on a more regular basis.82 From 
2015–2019, there were two periods on which the USWNT played more frequently 
on turf. The first was after the 2015 World Cup during the Victory Tour, where 
the USWNT played seven of 10 matches on turf.83 The USSF provided the de-
fence that the rationale for this was to play games across various cities, the large 
number of games to be played in a short period of time, and the preference to 
use venues with grass fields in preparation for the 2016 Olympics.84 The sec-
ond period was for three friendlies between July and October 2017. The reason 
provided for the turf on these occasions was that the USSF did not anticipate 
generating enough revenue to justify the cost of installing temporary grass, nor 
was it necessary to secure opponents.85 These were both held to be legitimate and 
non-discriminatory reasons. 
In relation to charter flights, the USWNT contented that the USMNT was 
provided with charter flights more frequently and more money was spent on air-
fare and hotels, despite the fact that the USWNT played more.86 From 2015–2020, 
the USSF spent $9 million on flights for the USMNT and $5 million for the 
USWNT. On this basis, the court ruled the USWNT had established a prima 
facie case of discrimination.87 Thus, the burden of proof shifted to the USSF 
to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Various reasons were put 
forward, the most prominent being that charter flights were used more often for 
the USMNT to give the struggling side a competitive advantage. This argument 
is perhaps the ultimate example of the price of success the USWNT was paying 
for its performances. The struggling USMNT’s performances were used as an 
excuse for the discriminatory treatment, despite the USWNT’s unprecedented 
success. This argument was described as “weak” and “implausible”88 and due to 
the evidence provided by the plaintiff, was sufficient to raise a genuine dispute. 
In April 2021, both parties came to a settlement on these issues, which guaran-
teed the women’s team equal working conditions.89
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It has been claimed that the USSF v. USWNT dispute “serves as a cautionary 
tale for future CBAs and contract negotiations within the labor context.”90 It has 
also been contended that the dispute serves as a cautionary tale in a different 
way—to the patriarchal structures inherent in sport.91 Women will only continue 
to further assert that their worth within elite sports cultures is valued. While the 
next step in their battle of equal pay remains to be seen, the impact of their battle 
for equality can be seen across the globe.
Global Equal Pay Disputes
The USWNT Equal Pay debate was considered a landmark case for women’s 
soccer, and the issue of gender equal pay is being rectified across a variety of 
contexts. The 2019 FIFA Women’s Football Convention, held before the 2019 
Women’s World Cup, was convened to discuss the key pillars of the FIFA 
Women’s Football Strategy. One pillar was to establish gender pay equity.92 
However, the conversation was very much started by the USWNT, since it first 
made a call for action in 2016. At this time, the environment for women in elite 
level soccer was less than satisfactory. In 2017, the International Federation of 
Professional Footballers (FIFPRO) reported that written and detailed contracts 
were rare, and players had concerns over childcare, economic remuneration, 
contract length, and post-career playing options. Women soccer players were 
stated to rely heavily on their national team income, as 49.5% of players are not 
remunerated by their clubs.93 For those that are salaried, 60% received less than 
$600 per month.94 Since then, however, there have been multiple challenges to 
the gender pay gap in international women’s soccer. 
In 2017, Finland’s Ombudsman for Equality investigated the issue of unequal 
pay at the national team level but decided that the pay discrepancy was not a 
breach of the national Equality Act.95 In June of 2017, the Scotland women’s team 
demanded equal pay for equal work, going on strike in order to improve wages 
and work conditions from the Scottish Football Association. It was reported 
90  Hutcherson, D. (2019). Striker no striking: U.S. Soccer Federation Inc. v. U.S. Women’s Nation-
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that they won some concessions, but not equality.96 In September of 2017, the 
Argentinian women’s national team was reported to be on strike, citing a lack 
of payment and basic resources to train and play properly.97 In the same month, 
it was announced that the Danish women’s national team was in dispute with 
Denmark’s football association (DBU) over unequal pay, having reportedly been 
in negotiations since November of 2016.98 The players went on strike, resulting 
in a friendly and a World Cup qualifier being cancelled. The Danish men’s team 
offered the women’s team 500,000 DKK (approximately £60,000), an offer that 
was declined by the Danish FA as the dispute persisted99 In October, a ‘partial 
agreement’ was announced that enabled matches to resume as the players and 
the DBU worked out a more permanent solution,100 with a four-year CBA later 
agreed upon by the parties.101 Simultaneously, the Norwegian FA declared that 
men and women were to receive the same pay for representing Norway, spurred 
in part by a donation of commercial income by the men’s team,102 the first nation-
al federation to do so. 
In 2018, more disputes emerged across the globe. In May, the New Zealand 
FA and the New Zealand Professional Footballers Association agreed on equality 
and parity for their senior men’s and women’s teams. This involved “pay parity, 
equal prize money, equal rights for image use and, most notably, parity across 
travel while representing New Zealand.”103 More countries followed suit in 2019, 
a year that is widely perceived a landmark year for women’s soccer following the 
high-profile success of the 2019 FIFA Women’s World Cup. In June, the Dutch 
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FA (KNVB) announced that it would move toward alignment of pay for the 
women’s and men’s national teams over the next four years, reaching parity in 
2023.104 In September, the Finnish FA announced new player contracts, meaning 
that Finland’s men’s and women’s national teams would receive the same pay,105 
the result of a long battle for equal pay by Finland’s women. In November, the 
Australian women’s national team, the Matildas, agreed to a deal with the Foot-
ball Federation Australia that placed them on the same pay scale as the men’s 
team. It was stated that players were to be valued equally, receiving the same cut 
of commercial revenue as well as parity in their training conditions and travel. 
However, prize money would continue to work on a percentage, which meant the 
men would still receive more.106  
The trend continued in 2020. In England, the Football Association declared 
England’s men’s and women’s teams have been paid equally in terms of match 
fees and match bonuses since the start of the year, estimated at £1,000 per 
game.107 The Brazilian FA (CBF) announced that their women’s national team 
had been paid the same as their men’s team since March, in terms of prizes 
and daily rates.108 In August, Sweden’s Equality Ombudsman—the government 
agency promoting equal rights—ruled that the Swedish Football Association had 
not discriminated against the women’s team by paying them lower wages than 
the men’s team. In September, similar to Denmark, the Swedish men’s national 
team decided to forego their wages for the remainder of the year to support the 
women’s team in negotiating for equal pay.109 In December, Nepal become the 
latest national soccer association to make a public announcement regarding pay 
equality for their men’s and women’s teams. The decision went into effect in 
January of 2021, a significant move for the women’s team, which previously 
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earned less than 50% of the men’s salary.110 It appears that the equal pay trend in 
international soccer will continue, although the extent to which these discussions 
will permeate across the whole soccer landscape are questionable. The 2020 
FIFPRO women’s soccer report, titled ‘Raising Our Game,’ built on the 2017 
research and highlighted women soccer players’ call to action: fair treatment, 
decent work, equal opportunities, and the right to viable career paths as pro-
fessionals in the industry.111 While pay conditions were improving for women 
in the game, FIFPRO reported that 3.6% of the 186 players who participated in 
the survey—women competing at the World Cup and playing at the top of the 
game—were not receiving any money to play. There is clearly some way to go. 
From the preceding analysis, it is clear the inception of Title IX created an 
opportunity for female athletes to experience equality in sport within the educa-
tional sphere, and the USWNT is a product of that equality. As such, their desire 
for equality now goes beyond education, and demands equality, certainly in 
terms of pay, within the professional game. Part II of this article will examine the 
gender pay gap, as well as an opportunity to embark upon a fight for legislative 
reform.
Part II.
Closing the Gender Pay Gap: A Lesson from Iceland?
The gender pay gap in sport is arguably larger than that in other professions, with 
male athletes earning millions of dollars while many female athletes struggle 
to make a living out of sport, and often have to subsidize their income with 
secondary employment. For example, in 2019, the highest paid men’s soccer 
player, Lionel Messi, earned in excess of $120 million, while the highest paid 
female soccer player, Alex Morgan, earned $5.8 million.112 Quite simply, there is 
“no other industry that has such a wage gap … Depending on the country context 
and sport, a man can be a billionaire and a woman [in the same discipline] cannot 
even get a minimum salary.”113 
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This article advocates that the most obvious argument, and perhaps also the 
most moral argument, for equal pay is rooted in employment legislation across 
the globe—‘Equal Pay for Equal Work.’ For example, in the United Kingdom, 
the Equality Act (2010) gives men and women the right to equal pay for equal 
work.114 The idea is simple in nature: men and women should be paid the same for 
doing the same job, regardless of the profession. Opponents of equal pay in sport 
often present the ‘business model’ argument—that it is not the same work be-
cause men’s sport usually generates more income. As Syed argues, “Norwegian 
male footballers are effectively doing a different job. In economic terms, they 
are more productive, persuading more fans and TV viewers to watch them, and 
more companies to sponsor them.”115 However, and perhaps unsurprisingly, this 
argument is nullified by the USWNT. In the 2015 World Cup, the women’s team 
generated a profit of over $6 million, while their higher paid male counterparts 
generated a profit of $2 million.116 Likewise, the USWNT jersey is the best-sell-
ing jersey of all time on Nike.com.117 If the business-model argument is the ‘way 
forward’ then the USWNT’s claim for equal pay is very much valid. 
Equal pay in soccer, and sport generally, is clearly an issue that is here to 
stay. The preceding analysis shows that by offering athletes a ‘taste’ of equality 
in sport within the educational sphere through Title IX, these athletes now seek 
equality, not just for themselves, but for future generations of female athletes in 
the realm of professional sport. As Hope Solo put it, “we believe it’s a respon-
sibility for women’s sport, specifically women’s soccer, to really do whatever 
it takes for equal pay and equal rights and to be treated with respect.”118 As the 
aforementioned discussion related to global pay illustrates, the USWNT has 
started a conversation that certainly isn’t over. However, for the reasons outlined 
in the analysis of the equal pay lawsuit, it is clear that the USWNT will struggle 
in their fight for equal pay under the Equal Pay Act given there is no breach of the 
legislation. Thus, this article proposes that the USWNT should adopt an approach 
that fights for legislative reform, using Iceland’s 2018 Equal Pay legislation as an 
example of a fair, equitable, and robust system.
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In 2018, Iceland took a major step forward in the fight for gender equality, 
enacting new legislation. Iceland, which has a population of around 350,000, is 
ranked number one in the world for gender equality.119 Similar to the U.S., soccer 
is among is most popular sports in Iceland, alongside handball and basketball. 
Iceland’s new equal pay act, ‘Equal Pay Certification,’ contains amendments to 
the 2008 Gender Equality Act and is aimed “to reduce gender-based pay discrim-
ination and promote greater equality in wages between women and men, equality 
of economic standing which will result among other things, eventually, in more 
equal pension payments for women and men.”120 It is hoped that by 2022, Iceland 
will have eradicated the gender pay gap completely.121
The first notable point is that under Article 4, jobs are not to be designated 
gender specific, nor should there be a gender gap in positions of authority. It 
states:
employers and trade unions shall systematically work towards equal-
ising the position of women and men in the labour market. Employers 
shall specifically work towards equalising the position of women and 
men within their companies or institutions and promote a classification 
of jobs that does not designate them as specifically women’s or men’s 
jobs. Special emphasis shall be placed on equalising the positions of 
women and men as regards managerial and influential positions.122
Also of importance is the fact that as per Article 6, “women, men and per-
sons whose gender is registered as neutral in Registers Iceland shall be paid equal 
pay and enjoy equal terms of employment for the same jobs or jobs of equal 
value.”123 The Act goes further to state that employees should receive the same 
terms of employment for jobs of equal value, and allows workers to discuss these 
terms, including pay, openly with one another. As Perras explains, “this alone 
will help employees to more easily determine when they are being discriminated 
against. There will be more transparency in the pay process, and therefore, more 
accountability for companies that practice wage discrimination.”124
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The new legislation also requires a systematic approach to compliance. Ar-
ticle 7 requires that companies with 25 or more employees, thus including most 
sports teams, obtain equal pay certification from the government or an approved 
agency. This process is rigorous and examines companies’ internal policies, 
the way in which they classify and value jobs, and the objectively of their pay 
structure.125 This certification must be renewed every three years, ensuring the 
gender pay legislation is consistently applied and followed. This is perhaps in the 
most proactive section of the legislation, the burden is on the employer to ensure 
that they are paying genders equally, rather than requiring the employee to prove 
that they are being discriminated against, as the USWNT had to do. If a company 
fails to receive the required certification or is in violation of the legislation, the 
Centre for Gender Equality can impose per diem fines.126 Likewise, there are no 
defenses to a breach of the new legislation, and companies must prove that any 
difference in wages in justified, otherwise discrimination is assumed.127
The aforementioned overview illustrates how proactive legislation can 
provide a vital piece of armory in the fight for equal pay, in spite of the fact that 
the legislation is not specific to sports. By means of example, the Icelandic male 
and female soccer teams have received equal pay since 2018.128 As discussed 
previously, the downfall of the USWNT’s lawsuit was that they could not satisfy 
the court that the EPA had been breached, primarily due to the CBA that they 
themselves had signed. It is unlikely that the fight for equal pay will succeed 
under the current legislation, so it is the proposal of the authors that the USWNT 
use the Icelandic model as a springboard in the push for legislative reform.
Looking Back and Moving Forward
Title IX is inarguably one of the most important pieces of legislation in U.S. 
history. It guarantees equality within the educational sphere as a whole, not just 
within sport. As this article’s analysis illustrates, the introduction of legislation 
caused significant controversy, and ensuring compliance has brought many legal 
challenges. Cases such as Grove, Haffer, and Cohen all serve to illustrate this 
very point. However, 50 years on from the inception of Title IX, the USWNT 
epitomizes its very meaning. The majority of those athletes are products of Title 
IX, or are rather ‘Title IX babies’ and have experienced equality within the college 
environment and now stand as the most successful national soccer side, male or 
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female, in history. In becoming these successful athletes and by experiencing the 
equality that Title IX affords, the USWNT now seeks equality beyond Title IX 
and education into the professional realms, specifically, in relation to equal pay. 
Had it not been for Title IX, these conversations and debates around equal pay 
may not be happening, or happening on such a global scale. 
Although the USWNT’s lawsuit guaranteed equal treatment in relation to 
working conditions, and this should be heralded as a success, their equal pay 
claim ultimately failed because in law, there was no breach of the EPA, primarily 
by virtue of their CBA. It must be acknowledged that these athletes ultimately 
agreed to this CBA and do enjoy benefits that their male counterparts do not 
receive (e.g., an annual salary and injury protection). 
In order to continue the conversations and succeed in the pursuit of equal 
pay, it is arguable that the USWNT must now push for more substantive change, 
by way of legislative reform. Put simply, in absence of proving a breach of the 
EPA, the USWNT needs to adopt a different approach. In analyzing the Icelandic 
legislation, it is clear that there is scope and appetite for reducing the gender pay 
gap. By championing legislative reform, the USWNT has an opportunity to not 
only address the gender pay gap within sport, but across all professions. In doing 
so, that legislative reform has the potential to enjoy a similar impact on gender 
equality as Title IX has done in the U.S.
